The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

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Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by JJCH reclining » Sat Dec 07, 2019 10:51 pm

Whilst there was a technical divide between the NLF and its forces and Hanoi’s PAVN, for all practical purposes the war was directed by Hanoi, especially so post 1968. Surviving NLF forces were heavily reinforced by northerners. It’s also worth noting that many of the larger ‘VC’ mainforce regiments and divisions originated in the North and/or had substantial PAVN elements as early as 1965.

The 1968 Tet Offensive was, in many ways, a diversion from or apostasy of, the long game strategy. There was a divide within the ranks of Hanoi’s leadership on strategic direction. The dominant faction, headed by Lê Duẩn actually believed that a General Offensive would topple the South and rally the bulk of the population and ARVN. He believed that so fervently, that in spite of the failure of Tet to meet its objectives, that in spite of the evidence, he launched two, smaller country-wide offensives (the May mini-Tet and June offensive) that were equally disastrous. After those, the penny dropped and Lê Duẩn, literally said enough is enough.

Using the US metric of bodycount, Tet was a tactical win for the US and allies. Using the North’s own metric of swift regime change, Tet was clearly a defeat for Hanoi. None the less the clear and obvious impact it had on US political, military and public opinion renders it an overall strategic victory.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Mac And Cheez » Sat Dec 07, 2019 10:05 pm

More to the point, I’m not sure Mao makes a meaningful distinction between tactics and strategy.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Macunaima nli mm » Sat Dec 07, 2019 9:26 pm

More to the point, I’m not sure Mao makes a meaningful distinction between tactics and strategy.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Macunaima nli mm » Sat Dec 07, 2019 9:26 pm

More to the point, I’m not sure Mao makes a meaningful distinction between tactics and strategy.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Condottiero » Sat Dec 07, 2019 7:30 pm

Picador wrote:
Condottiero wrote:
Tet was a tactical victory for the US, but a strategic loss due to the casualty count...


Fuck me, and you accuse others of being thick? :roll:

Care to point out where I'm wrong?

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Condottiero » Sat Dec 07, 2019 7:28 pm

Macunaima nlimm wrote:Here is a legitimate “orientalism”, however: I’m not sure that the Chinese military tradition makes a clear cut decision between tactics and strategy as the Clausewitzian tradition does. It does indeed seem that Tsun Tsu sees warfare in a much more wholistic fashion than the Enlightenment-oriented Clausewitz.

Given this, it’s an open question whether or not your distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” victories is anything other than a philosophical tautology, Condi. Speaking as an anthro, here.

Thirty-Six Stratagems

Chinese military tradition, nor any other military tradition in the pre-modern world, didn't make any clear cut distinction between tactics and strategy, due to the simplistic mode of waging war. Occasional mention of or allusion to strategy and tactics pop up, like in the Taktika of Leo VI, but it's the ideas of the author, so no consensus with other authors, unless referencing a prior work.

Sun Tzu:
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.


Sun Tzu's Art of War does try to make a distinction, but as a product of the period, it's not as "scientific" and can be as general or specific depending on the reader's interpretation.

Clausewitz's strategy and tactics and Jomini's grand tactics occurred in an era when warfare was increasing in complexity. Modern Chinese military still references the classics, but not in isolation.

The idea of genius in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu

Does Sun Tzu's The Art of War influence China's military behavior? A case study of the 1962 Sino-India War

Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Picador » Sat Dec 07, 2019 7:14 pm

Condottiero wrote:
Tet was a tactical victory for the US, but a strategic loss due to the casualty count...


Fuck me, and you accuse others of being thick? :roll:

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Macunaima nlimm » Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:26 pm

Here is a legitimate “orientalism”, however: I’m not sure that the Chinese military tradition makes a clear cut decision between tactics and strategy as the Clausewitzian tradition does. It does indeed seem that Tsun Tsu sees warfare in a much more wholistic fashion than the Enlightenment-oriented Clausewitz.

Given this, it’s an open question whether or not your distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” victories is anything other than a philosophical tautology, Condi. Speaking as an anthro, here.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Condottiero » Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:24 pm

Macunaima nlimmm wrote:Ironically enough, DR Gibbin’s book was a response to state-directed gistorical revisionism in the 1980s, which sought to cast Vietnam as a victory betrayed by “libruls”.

If you like his book, his second book, Warrior Dreams, goes a long way to explaining the Walt culture that has infected TNP.

Its' Gibson, not Gibbins, and no have issue with his PhD, just issues with arseholes using it as an excuse to silence discussion. No different than some shit peddling someone's book on Faux News and touting the bibliography.

Re: The Sad Cunts with No Life Thread

Post by Macunaima nli m » Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:23 pm

Like I said, the U.S. lost the war and it wasn’t due to “librul backstabbing”. And yes, American conservatives have trouble getting their head around that salient, empirical fact.

Thus began the first wave of historical revisionism, in the Reagan 80s, lead by conservatives who argued, like Condi, that the U.S. never lost a battle and that the logical upshot of this was that the U.S. COULDN’T have lost the war without some sort of internal betrayal.

This, obviously, ignores a salient and indisputable political fact: that every American president from Eisenhower to Ford KNEW FULL WELL that the U.S. couldn’t win a land war in Asia for a series of very obvious reasons.

Now, the left idea that the NVA/NLF forces (and the two were certainly more in line with each other than the RVN/US positions were) were clever Asia strategists that outthought the western imperialists through Yellow Magic was ridiculous and, as Condi points out, more than a bit racist. The NVA/NLF manifestly wanted another Dien Bien Phu-style decisive victory, tried to get it a few times, and fell short.

And yeah, this was a victory that was supposed to be in a Western, “conventional” mold, not some sort of inscrutable Asia “anti-strategy”.

However, when they didn’t get that victory, UNLIKE the Americans, they didn’t reinforce failure and returned to the anti-conventional guerrilla warfare that has proven much more deadly to imperial ambitions — in the west and east — since the Iron Age, at the very least.

Gibbon’s book does fall a bit into the “inscrutable Asians” stereotype, but it is MOSTLY a critique of American warmaking and a very good one, at that. It shows how and why the U.S. was unable to change its tactics or strategy in the face of overwhelming evidence that they didn’t work.

It also shows, indirectly, why “nation building” and “low intensity warfare” have been repeatedly and unsuccessfully “reinvented” by the U.S. in the half century since the Vietnam War, with similar negative results.

Like I said, at the bottom of all this is an American view that wars are, by necessity, relatively short and decisive, with little to no American blood to be expended. A simple way of looking at it (parodied to good effect in the MASH movie) is that Americans really do seem to see warfare as football.

They are probably going to continue to do so until they are as devastated by a war as Europe was in WWII. Trump is off to a good start in heading them that way.

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