by JJCH reclining » Sat Dec 07, 2019 10:51 pm
Whilst there was a technical divide between the NLF and its forces and Hanoi’s PAVN, for all practical purposes the war was directed by Hanoi, especially so post 1968. Surviving NLF forces were heavily reinforced by northerners. It’s also worth noting that many of the larger ‘VC’ mainforce regiments and divisions originated in the North and/or had substantial PAVN elements as early as 1965.
The 1968 Tet Offensive was, in many ways, a diversion from or apostasy of, the long game strategy. There was a divide within the ranks of Hanoi’s leadership on strategic direction. The dominant faction, headed by Lê Duẩn actually believed that a General Offensive would topple the South and rally the bulk of the population and ARVN. He believed that so fervently, that in spite of the failure of Tet to meet its objectives, that in spite of the evidence, he launched two, smaller country-wide offensives (the May mini-Tet and June offensive) that were equally disastrous. After those, the penny dropped and Lê Duẩn, literally said enough is enough.
Using the US metric of bodycount, Tet was a tactical win for the US and allies. Using the North’s own metric of swift regime change, Tet was clearly a defeat for Hanoi. None the less the clear and obvious impact it had on US political, military and public opinion renders it an overall strategic victory.
Whilst there was a technical divide between the NLF and its forces and Hanoi’s PAVN, for all practical purposes the war was directed by Hanoi, especially so post 1968. Surviving NLF forces were heavily reinforced by northerners. It’s also worth noting that many of the larger ‘VC’ mainforce regiments and divisions originated in the North and/or had substantial PAVN elements as early as 1965.
The 1968 Tet Offensive was, in many ways, a diversion from or apostasy of, the long game strategy. There was a divide within the ranks of Hanoi’s leadership on strategic direction. The dominant faction, headed by Lê Duẩn actually believed that a General Offensive would topple the South and rally the bulk of the population and ARVN. He believed that so fervently, that in spite of the failure of Tet to meet its objectives, that in spite of the evidence, he launched two, smaller country-wide offensives (the May mini-Tet and June offensive) that were equally disastrous. After those, the penny dropped and Lê Duẩn, literally said enough is enough.
Using the US metric of bodycount, Tet was a tactical win for the US and allies. Using the North’s own metric of swift regime change, Tet was clearly a defeat for Hanoi. None the less the clear and obvious impact it had on US political, military and public opinion renders it an overall strategic victory.
